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ABSTRACT
IPv6 deployment is increasing as IPv4 address allocations near exhaustion. Many large or-
ganizations, including the Department of Defense (DOD), have mandated the transition to
IPv6. With the transition to IPv6, new techniques need to be developed to accurately mea-
sure, characterize, and map IPv6 networks. This thesis presents a method of profiling the
uninterrupted system availability, or uptime, of IPv6 addressable devices. The techniques
demonstrated in this study infer system restarts and the operational uptime for IPv6 net-
work devices with a specific focus on IPv6 routers on the Internet. Approximately 50,000
IPv6 addresses were probed continuously from March to June 2014, using the Too Big
Trick (TBT) to induce the remote targets to return fragmented responses. By evaluating the
responses, the uptime for approximately 35% of the IPv6 addresses can be inferred.
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The exhaustion of Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) addresses has led to an increas-
ing number of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) devices being deployed. According to
Google’s IPv6 adoption website, the percentage of users accessing Google via native IPv6
traffic has increased from 0.05% to 4.2% in the 4-year span from 2009 to early 2013 [1].
The number of IPv6 prefixes allocated by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA)
to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) increased from 650 in January of 2004 to 13,690
by February 2013. In the two years from 2011 to 2013, an average of approximately 200
new prefixes were allocated per month. This increase in traffic and allocations are indica-
tors that many organizations such as universities, large companies, U.S. government (USG)
agencies, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are transitioning from IPv4- to IPv6-based
networks [2]. This transition promises to provide these entities an exponentially greater
number of network addresses, increased addressing flexibility, and ease of management.
In 2011, several organizations, including Comcast, Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, con-
tributed significantly to the understanding of IPv6 by enabling the protocol on portions of
their networks. This coordinated event allowed researchers and the organizations to obtain
valuable experience and measurement data from production IPv6 deployment [3]. With
the adoption of IPv6 increasing, much work has been done to develop techniques to mea-
sure networks using this protocol. The Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analy-
sis (CAIDA) Archipelago (Ark) Measurement Infrastructure, Google’s IPv6 adoption, and
the Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) IPv6 measurement projects, are all
examples of the ongoing work focused on understanding the deployment and impact of
IPv6 networks, as well as the development of techniques for measuring performance on
these networks [1], [4], [5]. However, in contrast to IPv4 networks, there are relatively few
tools dedicated to the measurement and analysis of IPv6 networks. Tools such as Scam-
per (discussed in Chapter 3), Network Mapper (Nmap), and Wireshark have implemented
support for IPv6. However, IPv6 network measurement and analysis remains in its infancy.
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1.1 Motivation
The large address space, flexibility, and ease of management of IPv6 is accompanied with
possible security risks. Many security issues are not unique to IPv6 based networks; how-
ever, the specification for IPv6 negates some standard mitigation methods. The use of the
IPv6 routing headers to direct traffic, which is similar to source routing on IPv4 networks,
can be used to avoid traffic filtering devices. The IPv6 specification states that routers must
be capable of processing the routing header, as opposed to IPv4 networks where source
routing is disabled. Also, many IPv4 networks block Internet Control Message Proto-
col (ICMP) traffic to avoid many reconnaissance and enumeration attacks. However, in an
IPv6 network ICMP messages are required for several important tasks (e.g., neighbor dis-
covery). Additionally, the introduction of rogue devices could be harder to detect in large
address spaces [6], [7]. Understanding the behavior of network devices in an IPv6 network
is thus important.
This research investigates a specific area of IPv6 device profiling: remotely determining an
IPv6 device’s time since last restart and its uninterrupted availability or "uptime."
This study defines an IPv6 device as any network-attached device configured to commu-
nicate via IPv6. These devices could be routers, servers, or end-user systems. However,
this research is limited to the analysis of router interfaces. An expanded evaluation that
includes other device types is left to future work.
There are several intentional and unintentional events that might cause a device to restart,
including power failures, system crashes, software upgrades, and malicious activity, e.g.,
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The ability to detect these events can aid in measuring the
reliability of network devices. Reliability estimates are used to satisfy regulatory require-
ments, as metrics in Service Level Agreements (SLAs), and in comparing competitors.
Also, detection of unscheduled or unauthorized restarts can be indicators of possible secu-
rity related issues. The massive outage experienced by Time Warner Cable on August 27,
2014 [8], prompted New York Governor Andrew Cuomo to direct New York’s Department
of Public Service to investigate the event. Cuomo stated “dependable internet service is
a vital link in our daily lives and telecommunications companies have a responsibility to
deliver reliable service to their customers [9],” highlighting the importance of the need to
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measure and understand reliability of this critical infrastructure.
Similar to the concept of fingerprinting, profiling uses characteristics of the device to infer
information about the device. However, while fingerprinting typically seeks to identify a
specific device, type of device, or Operating System (OS), profiling seeks to reveal the
behavior of a device. Profiling allows measurements to not only answer what a given
system may be, and how the system performs under certain conditions, but also when a
device-wide event – such as a restart– occurs and ultimately help understand why the event
occurred.
The goal of this study is to develop profiles for network devices to identify patterns that can
be correlated to real world events. These patterns include the following: devices restarting
at set intervals indicating a possible maintenance window; multiple devices restarting at
approximately the same time indicating devices under the same administrative control;
multiple devices in a single Autonomous System (AS), or multiple AS’s restarting within a
short period, indicating a possible regional or enterprise-level event. This thesis also seeks
to identify anomalous behavior indicating the occurrence of one-off events. The profiles
can potentially discover previously unknown correlations between routers, networks, and
providers.
This research leverages the Too Big Trick (TBT) technique, developed by William
Brinkmeyer et al. [10]. The TBT (detailed in Chapter 3) was developed to work in an
IPv6 environment. Expanding the techniques developed in this study to measure uptime in
IPv4 environments is the subject of future work.
1.2 Department of Defense Applicability
As the Department of Defense (DOD), other governments, and nations transition to IPv6,
the techniques developed in this study can be used to collect data about critical infras-
tructure and devices of interest. The information collected can be used for defensive or
offensive operations. In both types of operations these techniques can aid in Center of
Gravity (CoG) analysis, helping to identify critical nodes by measuring the effects on the
networks if and when a device is restarted. Additionally, these techniques may reveal the
current security level of a device. If a security update was released and the device shows no
indication of being restarted, the inference would be that the update was not applied. Of-
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fensive cyber operations could use this information for targeting purposes, while computer
network defense activities could use the information to verify that security patches are be-
ing applied. Also, both entities could use these techniques as additional tools to determine
if an attack on a router or other network device was successful.
1.3 Research Questions
The questions this study aims to answer are:
1. Can IPv6 fragment identifiers reveal reboots and system uptimes?
2. Do cycles or anomalies exist? Cycles refer to events that occur at regular intervals,
for example a device that reboots on the 15th of every month. While an example of
an anomaly is a device that has not previously restarted restarting multiple times in a
single day.
3. Are there correlations between seemingly unrelated systems?
1.4 Summary of Major Contributions and Findings
The major contributions and finding of this research are as follows:
• Validation of the use of induced fragmentation via the TBT to identify router restarts.
• Introduction of a behavior-based profiling method of network measurements.
• Internet-wide probing of more than 49,000 candidate IPv6 addresses of which ap-
proximately 30% display identifiable restart behavior.
• Identification of approximately 5% of restarted addresses that are active for short
periods and present a large number restarts.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of the fundamentals of IPv6 and a review of prior
research that was used as the basis for this thesis.
• Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used in the thesis to include virtual lab configu-
ration, data set validation, and live network testing.
4
• Chapter 4 details the results derived from the analysis of data captured during this
study.
• Chapter 5 discusses conclusions based on this research and provides recommenda-
tions for future research.
5
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Related Work
The profiling approach, described in Chapter 1, can enhance the effectiveness of measure-
ments by eliminating variables such as interface or path failures. This benefit is achieved by
eliciting information from the device’s control plane. Changes in the control plane relate
to the device as a whole independent of the state of any single interface. Implementa-
tion differences between IPv4 and IPv6 have enabled new measurement techniques while
rendering some existing approaches obsolete. Techniques that involved probing the entire
range of possible addresses, such as the one used by Durumeric et al. in their study of the
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) ecosystem [11], would be impractical in an
IPv6 network.
This chapter covers a brief overview of relevant IPv6 (§2.1.1) characteristics. Also, existing
measurement techniques that form the groundwork for this study are explored.
2.1 Background
IPv6 deployment continues to gain momentum as IPv4 address allocation nears exhaustion.
The chief information officer (CIO) for the federal government released a memorandum in
September 2010 informing all USG agencies to transition to IPv6 [12]. The memorandum
included milestones for both public facing services and internal client applications that
communicate with the Internet or support enterprise networking to employ native IPv6
communications [12]. IANA allocated the last five available full Class A network blocks
to RIRs in February 2011 [13]. Starting in 2012, customers of Comcast’s home Internet
services were issued IPv6 addresses [14]. In April 2014, IANA announced that a single
Class A address block remained to service any future IPv4 request on a “First in, First out”
basis [15].
As the number of devices that connect to the Internet continues to increase, the adoption
of IPv6 is becoming a necessity. Additionally, the need for accurate measurement and
analysis of IPv6 networks becomes more important as more devices use IPv6 addresses na-
tively. Network measurement and analysis of IPv6 networks remains in its infancy, mainly
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because many widely used techniques developed for IPv4 networks do not work in IPv6
environments.
2.1.1 IPv6 Fundamentals
IPv6, the successor of IPv4, exponentially increases the number of possible IP addresses
from 232, approximately 4.2 billion, to 2128, representing more than 340 undecillion (340
followed by 36 zeros) addresses. To make IPv6 addresses easier to represent, the dotted dec-
imal IPv4 format (111.222.333.444) was replaced with a new hexadecimal colon delimited
format (AAAA:BBBB:CCCC:DDDD:EEEE:FFFF:0000:1111).
The IPv6 header (Figure 2.1) is simpler than the of IPv4 (Figure 2.2). The removal of many
of the fields in the IPv4 header allows IPv6 to have a fixed header length of 40 bytes verses
the variable 20 to 60 bytes of its predecessor. Some of the information represented by the
deleted fields is included in IPv6 extension headers, while some information no longer has
any relevance. Of particular interest to this work, are the identification, flags, and fragment
offset fields. In IPv6, these fields are incorporated into an extension header known as the
fragment header.
2.1.2 IPv6 Fragmentation
Packets are fragmented when their size exceeds the Path Maximum Transmission Unit
(PMTU) of any link through which the packet must travel. Since the PMTU can change
as packets are routed along different paths to their destination, most nodes use PMTU dis-
covery to ensure the packet size does not exceed the PMTU of any route to its destination.
If PMTU discovery is not used, nodes set the size of the packets sent to the minimum
link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) value allowed in the IPv6 specifications, 1280
bytes [6], [17]. When using the PMTU discovery process a node estimates the MTU of
a given path. If the actual MTU for any segment of the path is less than the estimate, an
ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) message is sent back to the node by the router containing the
MTU for the link and as much of the original packet as possible without exceeding 1280
bytes. Once received, the MTU in the packet too big message is cached by the node, for
no less than five minutes. All packets larger than the PMTU generated by the node using
that path are fragmented to a size that does not exceed the cached value [17], [18]. The
8
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|Version| Traffic Class | Flow Label |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


















Figure 2.1: IPv6 Header, from [6].
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| IHL |Type of Service| Total Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identification |Flags| Fragment Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time to Live | Protocol | Header Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2.2: IPv4 Header, from [16].
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fragmentation extension header is added to all fragments of the original packet.
In IPv6, fragmentation is not done by the routers. Instead, fragmentation is the respon-
sibility of the sending host. Removing in-transit fragmentation eliminates the processing
overhead needed to deal with fragments from the routers and helps make forwarding more
efficient. When a packet needs to be fragmented, the sending host will add a fragment
header to the packet. The presence of this header is indicated by the value 44 in the next
header field of the header immediately preceding the fragment header [6].
The fragment header (Figure 2.3) is composed of six fields. A detailed description of each
field from Request for Comments (RFC) 2460 is provided below [6]:
• Next Header - Uses the same values as the protocol field in the IPv4 header. Iden-
tifies the initial header type in the fragmentable part of the original packet. The
fragmentable part of a packet refers to the packet minus the IPv6 header and any ex-
tension headers that needs to be processed by any nodes en route to the destination.
• Reserved - A reserved 8-bit field. At transmission the field is initialized to zero, and
is ignored by recipients.
• Fragment Offset - An unsigned integer representing the offset of data relative to the
beginning of the fragmentable part of the original packet.
• Res - A reserved 2-bit field. At transmission the field is initialized to zero, and is
ignored by recipients.
• M flag - This field is 1-bit long; when set to 1 the field indicates more fragments
follow, and last fragment when set to 0.
• Identification - A 32-bit field that contains a value generated by the source of the
packet to identify all fragments that comprise the original packet. This value must








Figure 2.3: IPv6 Fragment Header, from [6].
The 32-bit size of the identification field in the fragment header is of particular importance
to this thesis. Approximately 4.2 billion values can be represented in this field as opposed to
only 64k in the 16-bit identification field of the IPv6 header [16]. Additionally, the PMTU
process minimizes fragmentation in an IPv6 network, effectively ensuring the fragment
identification field is seldom used. These two factors eliminate the problems of identifica-
tion number overflow and wrapping that would otherwise make this field unsuitable for use
in this study.
The PMTU discovery process, and the establishment of a 1280-byte minimum MTU value,
is meant to reduce, but not eliminate, fragmentation in IPv6 networks. Fragmentation is
a normal response to changes in network conditions; however, deliberate fragmentation is
used for various reasons. Deliberate fragmentation is not new in IPv6 networks. Similar
to IPv4, deliberate fragmentation in IPv6 networks can be used for Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) evasion [19] and OS fingerprinting [20]. Deliberate fragmentation is also
used for alias resolution (§2.2) to identify a single device with multiple IPv6 addresses
assigned.
2.2 Related Work
Most prior stability measurement work is concerned with end-to-end path measurements
[21]–[23]. Current stability measurement techniques do not focus on the endpoints. These
techniques rely on variants of tools, such as traceroute and ping, to infer congestion or jitter
along the path between the endpoints. Much of the work targeted at endpoints is in the area
of alias resolution. Alias resolution determines if multiple layer 3 addresses belong to a
given router. Many of the techniques pioneered to perform alias resolution measurements
are used as the basis of this work.
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2.2.1 Alias Resolution techniques
Many tools and techniques have been created to perform alias resolution including Ally
[24], Monotonic ID-based Alias Resolution (MIDAR) [25], RadarGun [26], and speedtrap
[27]. Fundamentally, these techniques rely on the fact that the multiple interfaces of a
router use a common counter when generating fragment identifiers. Speedtrap is the only
technique in this list that is used on IPv6 networks. RadarGun and speedtrap provide a
foundation for this thesis work.
RadarGun introduced the concept of measuring the rate a router’s fragmentation counter
increases to determine the natural “velocity” of the counter. Through observation, a re-
searcher can infer that interfaces with the same velocity are in fact aliases. This helped
overcome the O(n2) problem that limited Ally [26].
Speedtrap expanded on the authors’ earlier work where the TBT was introduced [10]. The
TBT is a technique used to cause an IPv6 enabled device to send fragmented packets in
response to a crafted PTB message (illustrated in Chapter 3). Speedtrap also demonstrated
that IPv6 routers, in contrast to IPv4 routers, do not have a natural velocity. The lack
of a natural velocity allows for more accurate measurements using the Internet Protocol
Identification (IPID) generated by IPv6 devices. Additionally, Speedtrap identified several
different ways that routers respond to PTB messages: with monotonic incremental IPIDs,
random values, or by sending no fragments or becoming unresponsive [27].
2.2.2 System Restart and Operational Time Inference
Many operational time (uptime) measurements require local access and are not focused on
individual network devices, but rather the path between the devices. Network management
tools, such as the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), can be used to remotely
determine the uptime of devices; however, these tools require some level of administrative
access to the devices. This study assumes no administrative access to devices. The Nmap
tool (discussed next) includes a technique to remotely infer the operational times of end-
user devices.
The measurement of operational times for home broadband networks is gaining greater
importance, as more homes become more reliant on connecting to the Internet for services
such as banking, emergency assistance, and home phone. The measurements for these
12
networks rely on collecting data locally from end-points within the homes. The focus of
these measurements are service interruptions and packet loss from the perspective of the
local device, a cable modem for example. [28]
Router-level restarts are sometimes addressed in studies focused on the stability of Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP). These studies illustrate how a routing update caused by a link
failure can trigger multiple updates in BGP; however, router restarts are one of many possi-
ble causes for link failures [29]. Studies of this type do not specifically measure individual
router behavior, but instead focus on effects routers have on the overall BGP infrastructure.
Nmap, an open source network discovery and security auditing tool, attempts to remotely
infer how long a end-user system has been operational as part of the tool’s OS discovery
process. Nmap uses the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) timestamp options to esti-
mate the number of seconds from the last system reboot. The TCP timestamp option is
a 10-byte field that can be specified as part to the TCP header [30]. The system’s cur-
rent clock value, stored in the Timestamp Value (TSval) subfield, a 4-byte field within the
timestamp option field, is used as the basis of system operational time estimations. The
relatively small size of the TSval affects the accuracy of this calculation due to value wrap
around. Accuracy is also lessened because the TSval field is not initialized to a standard
value, such as zero when reset. [31]
The Netcraft service uses a similar technique to determine the uptime of websites [32].
This thesis attempts to bridge the gap in stability measurements by introducing techniques
to remotely infer restarts and operational time at the individual router level.
13




This study involves analyzing IPv6 responses to specific stimuli to determine what infor-
mation about target systems can be inferred. Crafted traffic was transmitted from a probing
system to target systems to elicit a specific response containing IPv6 fragment identifica-
tion numbers. Careful analysis of the fragment ID numbers can reveal a change in the state
of many devices, specifically whether the device was rebooted since it was last probed.
The manipulation technique used for this thesis is the induced fragmentation process out-
lined in the paper “IPv6 Alias Resolution via Induced Fragmentation” [10] and termed
“TBT.” This technique involves sending a 1300-byte ICMP6 echo request (ping) to a target
to ensure that the target is alive and responds to ICMP6 echo requests. If the corresponding
echo response is received, the prober sends a PTB message with a small MTU (e.g., 1280
bytes) to the target. The target (or target’s interface) caches the MTU size specified in the
PTB message as the PMTU to the prober. The TBT technique causes the target to fragment
any packet destined for the source of the PTB message that is larger than the size specified,
as shown in figure 3.1.
Echo Request (1300 Bytes)
Echo Response (1300 Bytes)
Packet Too Big (MTU 1280 Bytes)
Echo Request (1300 Bytes)
Echo Response (1280 Bytes, Frag ID X)
Echo Request (1300 Bytes)







Figure 3.1: Too Big Trick (TBT)
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It is important to note that TBT exercises a router’s control plane functionality, i.e., the
IPv6 stack of the router itself, rather than any forwarding functionality. TBT is particularly
effective because network devices (routers and servers) in an IPv6 architecture are normally
not the originators of fragmented traffic, the IPv6 specification states that the originating
entity is responsible for fragmentation [6].
This chapter describes the phased methodology used in this thesis.
3.1 Laboratory Testing
Before performing live Internet measurements, this study first used a virtual lab consist-
ing of a probing system, network routers, and end-host systems to assist in understanding
how IPv6 nodes respond to the probing technique used in this thesis. A combination of
VirtualBox and Graphical Network Simulator (GNS3) [33] was used to build the virtual
environment shown in Figure 3.2. The virtual guest systems consisted of two routers, run-
ning different versions of the Cisco Internetwork Operating System (IOS); end-hosts run-
ning Ubuntu Linux, Windows 7, CentOS Linux, and OpenBSD end-hosts running Ubuntu,
Windows 7, CentOS, and OpenBSD; and a Debian Linux probing system. Scamper, a
multi-purpose packet-prober [34], was the primary tool used for sending and collecting
probe data. The probing system used Scamper and Linux shell scripts to send probes to
the destination host to emulate the TBT. Testing in this environment allowed the probing
and data collection process to be refined and verified. First, laboratory testing was used to
verify the Scamper tool was able to implement the TBT. Also, through testing and obser-
vation, the number of probes to send to each host per round was determined. Four probes
per host was revealed to be ideal to collect enough information to analyze the host while
minimizing the time per round.
In addition, the behavioral characteristics of the various guest OS’s outlined by Brinkmeyer
were verified [35]. The Windows and Linux systems returned monotonically increasing
sequential fragment identifiers in response to probes. Both OS’s also reset the counters
to a base value after a restart. The only difference is that the Windows system reset the
counter to zero while the Linux systems reset the counter to an predetermined arbitrary
value. The OpenBSD system returned random values in response to probing and restarts.










Figure 3.2: Testing Lab Layout
returned sequentially increasing fragment identifiers in response to probes, and reset the
initial identifier value to 1 after restarts.
3.2 Data Set Validation
The CAIDA IPv6 Topology Datasets from January and February 2014 were used as the
source of possible candidate router addresses for this study. These Datasets were cre-
ated using Scamper to preform continuous traceroutes from CAIDA’s globally distributed
Ark monitors [36]. The 968 trace files collected by CAIDA during this two-month pe-
riod were parsed in order to compile a list of candidate router interface addresses. First,
all the records were combined and normalized to remove any duplicate addresses. Next,
any IPv6 link-local addresses (fe80::/10) were filtered out. These addresses are equivalent
to 169.254.0.0/16 addresses in IPv4. The IPv6 link-local address is used for automatic
addressing, neighbor discovery, or in the absence of a router for single link connections.
Packets sourced from this address range should not be forwarded by routers [37]. The pars-
ing process produced a list of 52,154 candidate addresses. Whois searches, using the Team
Cymru community service [38], revealed these addresses spanned 3,100 AS’s, registered
in 125 countries.
3.2.1 Candidate testing
The next step in the data set validation process was testing the suitability of each candidate
address. An address was considered suitable for this thesis if the address consistently re-
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sponded to ICMP6 echo requests generated by Scamper. Suitability testing was conducted
from an Internet attached Linux system configured with the Scamper tool and native IPv6
networking. The first phase of testing used the system’s built-in ping utility. All systems
in the candidate list were sent echo requests at random intervals over a three-day period;
each address was sent 10 echo requests per interval. Systems that failed to respond to at
least one request, indicating the system was completely unreachable, were removed from
the list. Next, the Scamper ping command was used to probe the modified list of addresses
at random intervals for an additional three days. Systems failing to respond to at least one
request during this phase of testing were removed from the list. Approximately 95.5% of
all candidates tested were suitable, producing a final list consisting of 49,823 responsive
node addresses.
3.3 Internet-Wide Testing
A single Internet vantage point was used to probe all addresses and collect trace data every
six hours from March 5 to July 31, 2014. A random permutation of the address list was used
for each round of probing. During each round 40 addresses were probed simultaneously. A
probing round consisted of preforming the TBT to set the PMTU to 1280 bytes, followed
by three 1300 byte echo requests (refer to fig.3.1). Scamper was used to generate the traffic
in each round. The traffic was saved in Scamper’s native file format as timestamped trace
files [34]. Approximately 1.2 million probes were sent over the period covered by this
study. The traffic from these probes produced 5.8 gigabytes of data, saved in 525 trace
files.
The trace files were parsed to collect the fragment identifiers for each address. Addresses
were separated into three general groups based on the fragment identifiers; incremental,
random, or not fragmented. Additionally, a special group of addresses that consistently
stopped responding after receiving the PTB message was identified. Addresses in the incre-
mental group returned fragment identification numbers that increased in a predictable se-
quential pattern, e.g., if identifier x was received the next identifier received was x+1. Ad-
dresses in the random group returned fragment identification numbers with no discernible
sequential pattern, i.e., given identifier x the next identifier could not be predicted with any
degree of confidence. The no fragments group responded to probes but did not return frag-
mented packets. This behavior was attributed to the possible existence of a device along
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the path between the probing system and target address that reassembled the fragmented
responses, or a device along the path blocking the PTB message. Lastly, the special group
consisted of addresses that responded to the initial probes but went silent after the PTB
message was sent. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of addresses relative to each group.




No Fragments 12,224 24.5%
No Response post PTB 4,107 8.3%
The categorization of each address was performed using Scamper’s sc_speedtrap, a pars-
ing tool designed to analyze fragmentation identification numbers based on the Speedtrap
algorithm (see §2.2). Also, manual evaluation of the responses from a random sampling of
approximately 200 addresses per month was performed to verify the results produced by
sc_speedtrap. The identifiers produced by addresses in the random group did not reveal any
information that could be used to infer system restarts. The behavior of addresses included
in the incremental group proved more suited for researching the viability of the techniques
used in this study.
This study evaluated each address as an individual system. Multiple addresses may belong
to the same physical device; however, alias resolution is not an objective of this research.
3.3.1 Probing Validation
The probing system was checked throughout the duration of this study to ensure that probes
were sent during each of the defined rounds. System availability for the probing systems
was tested using system utilities, such as the uptime command, at different times through-
out the testing period. The ping6 command was used to test system connectivity, verifying
that the probing system could send and receive IPv6 traffic. The completeness of the prob-
ing was also verified by periodically parsing a sample of the trace files to ensure the file
contained entries corresponding to each address in the list; once verified, these files were
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categorized as “known goods.” Additionally, the file size of each trace file was compared
to the size of a known good file as a secondary check. Each trace file should contain the
same number of entries, in the same format, therefore, there should be a variance of no
more than 1% in the file size. Files that failed these checks were evaluated for usability and
discarded when necessary.
3.4 Reboot Algorithm and Operation Time Calculation
The determination of system restart was accomplished by comparing fragment identifiers
collected over a period of time. Algorithm 1 provides the system reboot detection pseu-
docode. To determine if a system restarts, the TBT is preformed to induce fragmented
responses from the target system. Next, a series of probes are sent to the target. The
responses from each probe are parsed to extract the fragment identifiers and timestamps
(timestamps are recorded in Epoch time). The most recent identifier (IDcurr) and times-
tamp (T Scurr) are compared to the preceding identifier (IDprev) and timestamp (T Sprev). If
the current timestamp is more recent than the previous timestamp, and the current identifier
is less than the previous identifier, a restart is indicated.
Algorithm 1 IPv6 Reboots: Determine whether an IPv6 address restarts
IDprev← 0
2: T Sprev← 0
send(T BT )
4: send(echo)
for i in range(4) do
6: IDcurr ← echo(ID[i])
T Scurr ← echo(T S[i])
8: if T Scurr > T Sprev and IDcurr > IDprev then




if T Scurr > T Sprev and IDcurr < IDprev then
14: return True




Once a system restart was identified, the formula (T Sprev - T Scurr)/86,400 was used to de-
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termine the system’s operational time prior to or between restarts. The formula converts the
Epoch time used for timestamps to a number of days. In the formula, the previous times-
tamp represents the starting time (e.g., beginning of time period, or last recorded restart),
the current timestamp represents the ending time, and 86,400 represents the number a sec-
onds in a day.
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This chapter presents detailed results from the analysis of traffic traces captured in this
study. The analysis focuses on the 17,227 addresses from the incremental group identified
in Chapter 3, Table 3.1. The addresses were evaluated based on two factors: fragment
identifier and time. 902 addresses (≈ 5%) displayed evidence of a 25% to 300% higher
number of restarts, compared to other addresses. These addresses are evaluated separately
in Section 4.2, because this behavior being the result of actual restarts was unlikely.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the restart behavior of the remaining 16,325 addresses. Approxi-
mately, 64% of addresses did not restart during this study. The following sections concen-
trate on analyzing the 5,933 addresses that indicated restarts.


























Figure 4.1: Cumulative distribution of restarts detected among the 16,325 addresses evaluated
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4.1 Analysis of Restarted Addresses
The fragment identifiers of the addresses analyzed in this section increase monotonically;
a decrease in the fragment identifiers indicate a restart. Laboratory testing, Section 3.1,
demonstrated that when a device restarts, the fragment identifier is reset to an initial value,
e.g., 0 or 1. Addresses were evaluated against this property to determine the number of
times the addresses restarted. The evaluation revealed approximately 66% of the addresses
that experienced a restart restarted once, while 85% restarted once or twice, and 95% of
addresses restarted fewer than 6 times during the time period March to July 2014 (see
Figure 4.2).
The number of restarts presented are considered the lower bound of possible restarts. This
research collected data 4 times daily in 6 hour windows, therefore multiple restarts in the
same window for a given address would be missed.

























Addresses with Restarts from March - July 2014




Whois searches using the Team Cymru community service [38] were used to map each
address to an Autonomous System Number (ASN). The addresses mapped to 1,315 AS’s,
spanning 103 countries. The country information was gathered from the whois records
returned. The MaxMind GeoIP2 database [39] was used to verify the location of approx-
imately 90% of restarted addresses, no information about the remaining addresses was
found in the database. The number of addresses in a given AS that experienced one or
more restarts ranged from 1 to 427. Figure 4.3 displays the distribution of addresses among
AS’s. The distribution shows 95% of AS’s contain less than 10 restarted addresses.






















AS Containing Addresses with Restarts
Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution of addresses that restarted per AS from March to July 2014
The AS’s were ranked based on two factors: the number of restarted addresses associated
with the AS, and a normalized fraction of the total addresses from the original 16,325
for each AS. The normalized fraction removes the bias caused by the disproportionate
distribution of addresses among AS’s in our dataset.
Table 4.1 enumerates the top 20 AS’s representing 30% of restarted addresses. Hurricane
Electric contained the most addresses experiencing a restart, however, due to the large total
number of Hurricane Electric addresses in our dataset, it is ranked sixth relative to other
AS’s based on the normalization fraction. This evaluation was restricted to AS’s containing
25 or more addresses.
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Table 4.1: Top 20 AS Containing Restarted Addresses.
AS Number Organization Name Number of Addresses Percentage Normalized
55430 Starhub Internet Pte Ltd 93 1.57% 97.89%
19271 Peak 10 74 1.25% 97.37%
12989 Eweka Internet Services B.V. 46 0.78% 80.70%
30071 TowardEX Technologies International, Inc. 53 0.89% 73.61%
22822 Limelight Networks, Inc. 58 0.98% 52.73%
6939 Hurricane Electric, Inc. 427 7.20% 49.36%
4826 Vocus Connect International Backbone 39 0.66% 48.75%
5580 TripartZ B.V. 68 1.15% 40.96%
1200 Amsterdam Internet Exchange B.V. 71 1.20% 40.34%
174 Cogent Communications 150 2.53% 39.47%
7922 Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. 130 2.19% 38.81%
1299 TeliaSonera International Carrier 66 1.11% 38.15%
6695 DE-CIX Management GmbH 54 0.91% 36.73%
3257 Tinet SpA 63 1.06% 34.05%
3549 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 66 1.11% 33.17%
5459 London Internet Exchange Ltd. 44 0.74% 32.12%
2914 NTT America, Inc. 51 0.86% 20.82%
3356 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 122 2.06% 20.33%
11427 Time Warner Cable Internet LLC 44 0.74% 19.47%
2516 KDDI CORPORATION 55 0.93% 18.27%
Further, analysis revealed that though the addresses were registered in 103 counties, 85%
of restarted addresses map to the 20 countries shown in Table 4.2. Approximately five
times more addresses map to the United States than any other country; however, Ukraine,
Singapore, and Russia contain more restarted systems per capita.
Table 4.2: Top 20 Countries with Restarted Addresses
Country Addresses Percentage Normalized Country Addresses Percentage Normalized
Ukraine 96 1.62% 55.17% Czech Republic 85 1.43% 34.69%
Singapore 139 2.34% 48.77% Austria 102 1.72% 34.58%
Russia 191 3.22% 44.11% France 138 2.33% 34.50%
Italy 91 1.53% 39.39% United States 2245 37.84% 34.34%
Romania 60 1.01% 39.22% India 57 0.96% 34.34%
Netherlands 316 5.33% 38.68% Germany 445 7.50% 34.15%
Brazil 74 1.25% 38.54% Australia 173 2.92% 33.99%
Indonesia 66 1.11% 36.67% Great Britain 223 3.76% 29.46%
Sweden 184 3.10% 36.08% Switzerland 88 1.48% 22.39%
Canada 119 2.01% 35.52% Japan 169 2.85% 19.07%
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4.1.2 Time-Based Analysis
Throughout this study each restart detected for an address was tagged with a Epoch times-
tamp indicating the time of restart. Each timestamp was used to calculate the time between
restarts for each address. These calculations are limited to the six hour span between prob-
ing windows. Also, multiple restarts between probing would introduce errors in this calcu-
lation; if an address experienced n restarts only the nth restart would be detected, creating
a possible error rate of 1 - 1n .
Table 4.3 gives an overview of general time ranges. The table only includes addresses
that restarted more than once during this study. The time ranges in the table represent the
average time between restarts for a given address. Addresses with a single restart do not
provide sufficient data points to determine the average time between restarts. The range
1 - 30 days contains double the number of addresses of all other ranges combined. This
observation may suggest conformity to the commonly used 30 day maintenance cycle.
Table 4.3: Average Days Between Restarts.
Day Range Addresses Percentage
1 - 30 Days 1465 77.9%
31 - 60 Days 376 20.0%
> 60 Days 40 2.1%
Table 4.4 summarizes the number of months in which a particular address restarted. The
number of months indicate the total number of unique months from the set of measured
months in which the address experienced a restart. The majority of addresses, 72.37%,
experienced restarts in only 1 of the 5 months during this study. The evaluation revealed
that fewer than 2% of addresses restarted at least once in every month during this study.
Overall, only 9.27% of addresses experienced restarts in 3 or more of the months of this
study.
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Table 4.4: Months Restart Detected per Address






Each address was evaluated to determine the number of days between the address’ last
restart and the end of the study (July 31, 2014). Figure 4.4 Illustrates the distribution of
operational times for each address. Approximately, 29% of addresses restarted within 30
days prior the end of the study, with a slight plateau between 27 and 30 days. An additional
20% of addresses restarted within 60 days prior the end of the study. More than 50% of
addresses restarted between 62 and 150 days prior to the end of the study, with an ≈ 5%
spike at 128 days.



















Days Since Address Last Restarted
Figure 4.4: Days from Last Restart to End of Study
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This study used four probing windows to collect data. The probing windows were as fol-
lows (Eastern Standard Time (EST)):
• Window 1: 00:00 - 05:59
• Window 2: 06:00 - 11:59
• Window 3: 12:00 - 17:59
• Window 4: 18:00 - 23:59
The fewest restarts occurred during probing windows two and three, 23% and 21% respec-
tively. Approximately 29% of restarts happened during window 4; while, 26% of restarts
occurred in window 1 (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Restarts Per Probing Windows






There were 903 addresses, spanning 416 AS’s, registered in 55 countries, identified during
this study that appeared to restart an unusually large number of times. Further evaluation
revealed the addresses appeared to restart between every probing round. Approximately
99% of these addresses returned at least two alternating sets of fragment identifiers (x, x+1,
x+2, y, y+1, y+2, x, x+1, x+2, ... ). Only 8 addresses, belonging to 6 AS’s, consistently
responded with the same sequence of fragment identifiers. This behavior indicates that
different devices responded to probes sent to a single address. The number of alternate
patterns varied from 2 to 5 across different addresses. Additionally, the frequency of al-
ternations was inconsistent across different addresses, or when observing a single address.
The addresses were probed in 2 hours, 1 hour, 30 minute, and 15 minute intervals in an
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attempt to better characterize the cyclical identifier behavior and its dependence on the
probing.
The additional rounds of probing were performed in 24 hour cycles. During each cycle
a different set of addresses responded to probing, suggesting some addresses were active
for only short periods of time. The responsive devices continued to respond with repetitive
fragment identifiers.
This behavior seemed unrelated to addresses experiencing restarts, but instead indicated
the presences of load balancing equipment, or perhaps security devices that maintain state
based on flows.
4.3 Observations
This study focused on determining restart behavior for addresses with incremental fragmen-
tation identification numbers. However, the initial evaluation process revealed additional
information worth mentioning.
• Device Replacement - Two addresses returning random identifiers at the beginning
of the study, began continuously returning incremental identifiers later in the study.
This change in behavior suggests the device associated with these addresses was
replaced with a different device.
• Spike in Restarts - On March 24th, double the number of addresses restarted com-
pared to any other day during this study. This activity may correlate with a vulnera-
bility announcement related to the software present on many network devices. The
MITRE corporation published a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) alert
detailing a DoS vulnerability in network devices approximately 30 days earlier. The
manufacturer of the devices publicly released detailed information about the vulner-
ability on March 26th. Another, significant spike occurred on July 8. This spike also
follows the publication of a CVE alert approximately 30 days earlier.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the number of restarts seen per day during this study. Restart
activity was highest during the first 30 days of the study. The majority of restart
activity remained at or below the median (121) level of restarts, until the final 30
days of probing.
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Figure 4.5: Number of restarts per day during this study. The green line represents the median
number of restarts per day, 121.
This analysis revealed that overall most devices associated with the IPv6 addresses tested
were stable, based on patterns of behavior. The predicable behavior of addresses was de-
termined over time, making identifications of anomalies possible.
Also, the data discovered during this analysis allowed profiles for individual as well as
groups of devices to be constructed. For example, Table 4.6 presents a basic profile of
the addresses in AS 55430 built from data collected in this study (the actual IPv6 addresses
were replaced by letter in the table to anonymize the data). Additionally, the table illustrates
addresses A and B, and addresses D and E demonstrate similar overall behavior, indicating
a relationship beyond AS membership.
Table 4.6: Illustration of a Basic Address Profile for Addresses from AS 55430.
Address Average Days Between Restarts Last Restart Detected Last Window Days Since Last Restart
· · ·
A 29 05/04/14 12:00 - 17:59 88
B 28 05/04/14 12:00 - 17:59 88
C 13 05/04/14 12:00 - 17:59 88
D 16 07/17/14 00:00 - 05:59 14
E 12 07/17/14 00:00 - 05:59 14
F 8 06/22/14 00:00 - 05:59 39
· · ·
31




This research sought to determine techniques to profile the behavior of network devices,
specifically routers. The study focused on whether fragment identifiers could be used to
remotely determine reboots and uptime of IPv6 addresses without remote access to the
underlying systems. IPv6 routers were targeted because they are critical components of the
IPv6 ecosystem. Understanding the behavior of these devices will provide insight into the
behavior of IPv6 networks as a whole. More than 49,000 addresses were probed, four times
daily, over a five month period. The TBT was used to cause addresses to send fragmented
responses. The responses were then analyzed to extract the desired information.
The techniques presented in this study proved effective on 35% of the addresses probed.
System restarts, operational time, and time between restarts could be inferred for these
addresses. In addition, this research revealed a subset of addresses that appear to restart a
large number of times relative to other addresses that indicated the presence of short lived
infrastructure, possibly due to network optimization technologies.
This study revealed that approximately 87% of the 16,325 addresses analyzed either did
not restart or restarted just once from March to July 2014. This observation suggests that
the majority of known routers in IPv6 networks are stable, but rarely updated.
An exhaustive probe of all possible IPv6 addresses is infeasible, however, the techniques
used in this study proved useful in creating behavioral profiles of known infrastructure
through targeted probing.
5.1 Limitations
The techniques presented in this study rely on collecting sequential fragment identifiers.
Approximately, 33% of the addresses tested returned random identifiers, 24% returned
non-fragmented packets, and another 8% stopped responding to probing following the PTB
message.
Although, operational time was determined for approximately 35% of the addresses tested,
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this determination was limited to the time following the receipt of the first probe response.
There was no way to calculate the length of time the addresses were active prior to the start
of probing for this study. Due to the frequency of probing the operational time estimations
had a possible variance of up to 6 hours. Additionally, the techniques used in this study
would not detect multiple restarts between probing windows. Given that the fragment
identifier for an address resets to the same value with each restart only the final restart
within any window would be detected.
This research focused on detecting, and developing patterns of behavior based on restarts.
The root cause of the restarts was not investigated. Differentiation between systems crashes
and controlled restarts will be the subject of future work.
5.2 Future Work
This section presents a list for future research expanding on the techniques used in this
study.
5.2.1 Use of Multiple Vantage Points
The use of multiple vantage points (i.e., probing systems in different physical locations)
may help determine if the addresses from the No Fragments and No Response post PTB
groups in Table 3.1 are being filtered at the host or along the path. Additionally, multiple
vantage points will provide greater accuracy during the filtering phase.
Multiple vantage points will provide a redundancy in case of file corruption and system or
path failure to a single vantage point.
5.2.2 BGP Correlation
The analysis of BGP updates may further verify the restart of a router. The correlation
between the time at which a router restarts and a BGP update for the prefix containing that
address can both validate that the router indeed restarted and identify the router as a peering
router. Even though BGP updates may result from a number of events such as equipment
failure, reconfiguration, or link failure [29], a BGP update that occurs at approximately
the same time as an address’ fragment identifier resetting would provide corroborating
evidence of an actual device restart.
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Additionally, multiple BGP updates observed between probing windows, in the absence of
evidence of link failures, may help identify restarts missed by probing alone.
5.2.3 End-Host Analysis
Expanding Internet-wide testing to include end-host systems, Web and DSN servers for
example, in future research will provide a more complete view of network device restart
behavior. The frequency of security updates relative to other system updates will produce a
clearer indication of the patching schedules for Internet accessible devices. These systems
not only need to apply security updates related to their OS but also for any additional
applications installed. Comparatively, these systems should restart more regularly than
routers.
Also, end-host analysis may allow the restart algorithm to be validated against traffic that
contain additional fragments. The addresses evaluated during this study only generated
fragment identifiers as a response to the TBT; however, end-host systems may generate
fragmented traffic as part of normal operation. This additional fragmented traffic will un-
cover possible discrepancies in the algorithm caused by multiple sources of fragmentation.
5.2.4 Root Cause Analysis
Analysis of the root cause of restarts will enhance the usefulness of the information re-
vealed by this study. Understanding whether an anomalous restart is the result of a system
crash, unscheduled maintenance, or malicious activity will provide security personnel and
administrators valuable insight regarding the proper follow-on actions to pursue. Multiple
system crashes may be an indication of imminent equipment failure, allowing administra-
tors to preemptively replace the device.
Also, the ability to differentiate between maintenance-related restarts and system crashes
would increase the accuracy of reliability and stability measurements. A device that restarts
for scheduled maintenance would be categorized as more reliable than one the experiences
a system crash.
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